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CHAPTER
 32
ARBITRAL AWARD AND ENFORCEMENT*
Arbitral Award
Upon hearing the dispute, the arbitrator will make a decision known 
as an ‘award’. The term ‘award’ means an instrument embodying 
an arbitrational decision on a matter referred to him. It is the final 
judgment or decision in writing by an arbitrator or arbitrators and as 
between the parties and their privies.1 The Arbitration Act 2005 (‘Act’) 
defines ‘award’ as, ‘a decision of the arbitral tribunal on the substance 
of the dispute and includes any final, interim or partial award and any 
award on costs or interest but does not include interlocutory orders’.2 
Where an award directs a sum to be paid, that sum shall, unless the 
award otherwise directs, carry interest as from the date of the award 
and at the same rate as a judgment debt.3 In any arbitral proceedings 
with more than one arbitrator, any decision of the arbitral tribunal shall 
be made by a majority of all its members.4 The award shall be made in 
writing and shall be signed by the arbitrator. In arbitral proceedings 
with more than one arbitrator, the signatures of the majority of all 
members of the arbitral tribunal shall be sufficient, provided that the 
reason for any omitted signature is stated.5 
* This chapter is contributed by Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed and Arun Kasi.
1 Wharton’s Law-Lexicon.
2 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 2.
3 Ibid s. 33(8). 
4 Ibid s. 31(1).
5 Ibid s. 33(1). 
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An arbitrator is under obligation to give a reasoned award, unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties or it is an award on agreed terms like a 
consent judgment. Section 33(3) of the Act provides that an award shall 
state the reasons upon which it is based, unless:
(a) the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given; or 
(b) the award is an award on agreed terms under section 32.
If a reasoned award is not required, it is not obligatory on the arbitral 
tribunal to give a detailed reason for its judgment. Otherwise, the 
arbitrator should explain how he reached the conclusion. Further, 
s. 33(4) provides that an award shall state its date and the seat of 
arbitration and shall be deemed to have been made at that seat. A copy 
of the award signed by the arbitrator shall be delivered to each party. 
The award of an arbitral tribunal shall be deemed final and conclusive 
as between the parties on all matters referred by the submission. 
Section 36(1) of the Act provides that an award made by an arbitral 
tribunal pursuant to an arbitration agreement shall be final and binding 
on the parties and may be relied upon by any party by way of defence, 
set-off or otherwise in any proceedings in any court. A valid award 
is like the judgment of a competent court of judicature, conclusive 
evidence as between the parties to it, regarding all matters included 
therein.6 In Intelek Timur Sdn Bhd v. Future Heritage Sdn Bhd,7 the 
Federal Court stated inter alia, that it is trite law that an arbitration 
award is final, binding and conclusive and can only be challenged in 
exceptional circumstances.
6 See Cairns Energy India Pty Limited & Anor v. The Government of  India [2009] 1 
LNS 1128, CA.
7 [2004] 1 CLJ 743, FC.
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Once an arbitrator has formally made an award, he has then discharged 
his function. His authority as an arbitrator comes to an end and with 
it, his powers and duties in the arbitration. He is functus officio8 and at 
that point the matter is beyond his control and as such has no power to 
proceed further.9 Section 36(2) provides that the arbitral tribunal shall 
not vary, amend, correct, review, add to or revoke an award which has 
been made except as specifically provided for in s. 35. In other words, 
an arbitrator has no power left, after he has made and signed the award, 
to make any change of substance in the award that he has made except 
in so far as was necessary to correct any accidental slip or omission. 
The underlying rationale of the doctrine of functus officio is to ensure 
certainty and finality in the decision of the arbitral tribunal. In Tan 
Guek Tian & Anor v. Tan Kim Kiat (No 2),10 Abdul Malik Ishak J stated:
The rationale for having the doctrine is two folds. Firstly, it will prevent 
the adjudicators be it arbitrators or judges from exercising a fresh 
judgment on the case and altering their award or decision. Secondly, it 
prevents re-examination of an issue by the adjudicators be it arbitrators 
or judges when they have decided on them. 
8 ‘Functus officio’ is a latin word which literally means having performed or 
discharged the task or duty; or whose office or authority has come to an end: See 
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Edn, 1999); Jowitt’s Dictionary of  English Law (2nd 
Edn, 1977); Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary (7th Edn, 1983). In the legal sense, 
it means that where a judge has made a final order after a hearing on the merits, 
the judge shall be deemed functus officio, and he cannot rescind, vary or set-aside 
the order made. In The New India Assurance Co Ltd v. Karam Singh [1972] 1 LNS 
155, Gill FJ explained the meaning and the application of  ‘functus officio’ in the 
following terms:
‘a person who has discharged his duty, or whose office of  authority is at an 
end ... Thus, once a president has convicted a person charged with an offence 
before him, he is functus officio, and cannot rescind the sentence and re-try 
the case. Similarly, once he has tried a civil action and made an order on the 
final determination of  the dispute between the parties, he is functus officio and 
cannot rescind his final order and re-try the case, or try a subsequent action 
between the same parties on the same subject matter’. 
9 See Tan Guek Tian & Anor v. Tan Kim Kiat (No 2) [2007] 9 CLJ 215, HC.
10 Ibid.
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It may be added that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, no party 
may publish, disclose or communicate any information relating to 
the arbitral proceedings under the arbitration agreement or an award 
made in those arbitral proceedings.11 This is so because the arbitration 
proceedings are both private and confidential. However, the exceptions 
to the above are as follows: 
(1) the publication, disclosure or communication is made to protect 
or pursue a legal right or interest of the party or to enforce or 
challenge the award in legal proceedings before a court or other 
judicial authority in or outside Malaysia; 
(2) the publication, disclosure or communication is made to any 
government body, regulatory body, court or tribunal and the 
party is obliged by law to make the publication, disclosure or 
communication; or 
(3) the publication, disclosure or communication is made to a 
professional or any other adviser of any of the parties.12 
Setting Aside Award
 
A party aggrieved with the arbitral award may apply to set aside the 
award in the High Court and all proceedings pursuant to this Act 
shall be heard otherwise than in an open court.13 It is trite law that the 
court’s intervention on arbitral awards should be minimal and can only 
be challenged in exceptional circumstances. In Jan De Nul (Malaysia) 
Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Anor,14 the Federal Court 
stated inter alia, that: 
11 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 41A(1)(a), (b).
12 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 41A(2)(a), (b), (c).
13 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 41B(1). However, s. 41B(2) provides that the court may 
order the proceedings to be heard in an open court on the application of  any 
party or if, in any particular case, the court is satisfied that those proceedings 
ought to be heard in an open court.
14 [2019] 1 CLJ 1, FC.
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... constant interference with arbitral awards would defeat the spirit 
of the Arbitration Act 2005 which for all intents and purposes, is to 
promote one-stop adjudication in line with the international practice. 
Again, in Huawei Technologies (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Maxbury 
Communications Sdn Bhd,15 Nallini Pathmanathan JCA stated:
... it remains a useful reminder that the provisions for recognition and 
setting aside an arbitration award under our Arbitration Act 2005 are 
premised on the UNCITRAL Model Law, which in turn is based on 
the New York Convention, more particularly Article V. The grounds in 
our Model Law are relevant therefore to all international commercial 
arbitration. It follows therefore that arbitration awards ought not to be 
set aside lightly as is the position adopted in most other jurisdictions 
utilising or adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law.
The circumstances in which an arbitral award may be set aside are 
prescribed in paras. 37(1)(a) and (b) of the Act,16 which provide:
(1) An award may be set aside by the High Court only if—
(a) the party making the application provides proof that—
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement was under any 
incapacity;
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law 
to which the parties have subjected it, or, failing any 
indication thereon, under the laws of Malaysia;
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper 
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral 
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present that 
party’s case;
(iv) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration;
15 [2019] 1 LNS 264, CA.
16 Konsortium Lord-Saberkat Sdn Bhd v. RP Chemicals (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd & Another 
Appeal [2019] 1 CLJ 728, CA.
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(v) subject to subsection (3), the award contains decisions on 
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; 
or
(vi) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of 
the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with 
a provision of this Act from which the parties cannot 
derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance 
with this Act; or
(b) the High Court finds that—
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the laws of Malaysia; or
(ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia.
The term ‘public policy’ is not defined in the Act though it appears in 
ss. 4(1),17 37(2)18 and 39.19 In the Jan De Nul’s case,20 the term ‘public 
policy’ was stated to signify some matter which concerns public good 
and public interest. In particular, the Federal Court stated: 
17 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 4(1) provides:
‘Any dispute which the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration under 
an arbitration agreement may be determined by arbitration unless the 
arbitration agreement is contrary to public policy or the subject matter of  
the dispute is not capable of  settlement by arbitration under the laws of  
Malaysia.’
18 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 37(2) provides:
‘Without limiting the generality of  subparagraph (1)(b)(ii), an award is in 
conflict with the public policy of  Malaysia where—
(a) the making of  the award was induced or affected by fraud or 
corruption; or
(b) a breach of  the rules of  natural justice occurred—
(i) during the arbitral proceedings; or
(ii) in connection with the making of  the award.’
19 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 39(1)(b) provides:
‘if  the High Court finds that—
(i) the subject-matter of  the dispute is not capable of  settlement by 
arbitration under the laws of  Malaysia; or
(ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of  Malaysia.’
20 [2019] 1 CLJ 1, FC.
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[58] The scope of public policy ground for setting aside an arbitral 
award could only be invoked in deserving cases ie, in instances 
where it appears a violation of the most basic notions of morality 
and justice. It covers fundamental principles of law and justice 
in substantive as well as procedural respect. Instances where the 
upholding of an arbitral award would shock the conscience, or 
clearly injurious to the public good, or wholly offensive to the 
ordinary reasonable and fully informed member of the public, 
had been held by courts in various jurisdictions to fall within 
the category of public policy ground for setting aside an arbitral 
award. Thus, instances such as “patent injustice”, “manifestly 
unlawful and unconscionable”, “substantial injustice”, “serious 
irregularity” and other similar serious flaws in the arbitral 
process and award, would also fall within the applicable concept 
of public policy and therefore by virtue of s. 37(1)(b)(ii) of the AA 
2005 when proven, can be a grounds for the court to exercise its 
discretion to set aside the award.
The term ‘public policy’ was also defined by the Singapore Court of 
Appeal in PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v. Dexia Bank SA.21 In 
particular, Chan Sek Keong CJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, 
stated: 
[59] Although the concept of public policy of the State is not defined 
in the Act or the Model Law, the general consensus of judicial and 
expert opinion is that public policy under the Act encompasses 
a narrow scope. In our view, it should only operate in instances 
where the upholding of an arbitral award would ‘shock the 
conscience’ (see Downer Connect (58) at (136)), or is ‘clearly 
injurious to the public good or ... wholly offensive to the ordinary 
reasonable and fully informed member of the public’ (see Deutsche 
Schachbau v. Shell International Petroleum Co Ltd [1987] 2 Lloyds 
Rep 246 at 254, per Sir John Donaldson MR), or where it violates 
the forum’s most basic notion of morality and justice: see Parsons 
& Whittemore Overseas Co Inc v. Societe Generalede L’Industrie  
du Papier (RAKTA) 508 F 2d 969 (second Cir, 1974) at 974.
21 [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597, CA.
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Further, s. 37(2) of the Act provides that an award made by an arbitral 
tribunal would be in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia where 
the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption; 
or a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred during the arbitral 
proceedings; or in connection with the making of the award. 
In Sigur Ros Sdn Bhd v. Master Mulia Sdn Bhd,22 the Court of Appeal 
held inter alia, that a breach of the rules of natural justice that occurrs in 
arbitral proceedings has a real and substantial impact on the outcome 
of the arbitration and the eventual award rendered, is plainly said to be 
in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia.
The High Court’s power to set aside the award would be exercised with 
utmost care and deliberation.23 As noted earlier, an application to set 
aside an award under sub-ss. 37(1) and (2) is based largely on the issues 
relating to the award-making process and does not relate to error of 
facts and/or law on the face of record unless the exception applies such 
as public policy. The court would scrutinise the reference to arbitration 
and other relevant documents to ascertain whether the arbitrator was 
well within or has gone beyond or outside the scope of the subject 
matter of reference to arbitration.24 The Court will intervene when 
the circumstances mentioned in s. 37 are established such as when the 
arbitrator has committed a misconduct himself or to the proceedings.25 
22 [2018] 8 CLJ 291, CA.
23 See Deb Brata Das Gupta v. Knight Frank & Anor [2005] 1 LNS 192, HC; Future 
Heritage Sdn Bhd v. Intelek Timur Sdn Bhd [2003] 1 CLJ 103, CA; Hartela 
Contractors Ltd v. Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor [1999] 2 CLJ 788, CA.
24 See Huawei Technologies (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Maxbury Communications Sdn Bhd 
[2019] 1 LNS 264, CA.
25 See Tetuan Bakar & Partners v. Malaysia National Insurance Bhd and Others [2010] 
4 CLJ 770, CA.
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The term ‘misconduct’, according to Raja Azlan Shah J (as His Highness 
then was) in Sharikat Pemborong Pertanian v. Federal Land Development 
Authority,26 means:
... irregularity and not moral turpitude. It includes failure to perform 
the essential duties which are cast on an arbitrator as such, for instance, 
failure to observe the rules of natural justice, appearance of bias and 
partiality. It includes any irregularity of action which is not covenant 
with the general principle of equity and good conscience. 
In Leong Kum Whay v. QBE Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors,27 the 
arbitrator’s award was liable to be set aside because he, without reason, 
departed from the established principle of awarding interest on a debt. 
Since the arbitrator had passed away, no remitting order could be made. 
On the issue whether it was open to the court to intervene with the 
award of the deceased arbitrator, Gopal Sri Ram JCA, in invoking the 
court’s inherent jurisdiction, stated: 
... that Act is silent about what is to happen where an arbitrator 
dies. Neither is there anything in the arbitration clause in the 
relevant policy that says what is to happen in a situation such as 
the present. There is therefore nothing in our way in doing justice 
in this case. To meet the ends of justice, I would accordingly 
order that the learned arbitrator’s award in respect of the fourth 
respondent do bear interest at the rate of 8% from the date of the 
accident.28 
26 [1969] 1 LNS 172, HC. See also Leong Kum Whay v. QBE Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd 
& Ors [2006] 1 CLJ 1, CA.
27 [2006] 1 CLJ 1, CA.
28 Ibid at 28.
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Any error or perceived error in the adjudication of the dispute in the 
award cannot and ought not to be relied upon by the losing party to 
set aside the award.29 In Intelek Timur Sdn Bhd v. Future Heritage Sdn 
Bhd,30 it was stated that:
... if an arbitrator had erred by drawing wrong inferences of fact from 
the evidence before him, be it oral or documentary, that in itself is not 
sufficient to warrant setting aside of his award. “It would be contrary 
to all the established legal principles relating to arbitration if an award 
based upon the evidence presented were liable to be reopened on the 
suggestion that some of the evidence had been misapprehended and 
misunderstood” per Raja Azlan Shah J (as he then was) in Sharikat 
Pemborong Pertanian & Perumahan v. Federal Land Development 
Authority ...
In short, an ‘arbitrator is the sole judge of findings of fact and whether 
he drew wrong inference of fact from the evidence itself is not sufficient 
as a ground to warrant setting aside the award’.31 It must be noted that 
when dealing with the arbitrator’s award, the court is not rehearing the 
matter. In Union of India v. Rallia Ram,32 it was stated that:
29 Huawei Technologies (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Maxbury Communications Sdn Bhd 
[2019] 1 LNS 264, CA. In Champsey Bhara & Co v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning 
& Weaving Co 1923 AIR PC 66 at 69, an Indian case decided on appeal by the 
Privy Council, Lord Dunedin observed:
‘An error of  law on the face of  the award means that one can find in the 
award or in a document actually incorporated thereto, as, for instance, a 
note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some 
legal proposition which is the basis of  the award and which one can then 
say is erroneous. It does not mean if  in a narrative a reference is made to 
a contention of  one party that opens the door to seeing, first, what that 
contention is, and then going to the contention on which the parties’ rights 
depends, to see if  that contention is sound.’
30 [2004] 1 CLJ 743 at 748, FC.
31 See Deb Brata Das Gupta v. Knight Frank & Anor [2005] 1 LNS 192 at [13], HC.
32 [1963] AIR SC 1685. See also Hartela Contractors Ltd v. Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd 
& Anor [1999] 2 CLJ 788, CA; Deb Brata Das Gupta v. Knight Frank & Anor 
[2005] 1 LNS 192, HC.
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The award in the decision of a domestic tribunal chosen by the parties, 
and the civil courts which are entrusted with the power to facilitate 
arbitration and to effectuate the awards cannot exercise appellate 
powers over the decision. Wrong or right the decision is binding if it 
reached fairly after giving adequate opportunity to the parties to place 
their grievances in the manner provided by the arbitration agreement.
Having said the above, it is noteworthy that an application for setting 
aside the award may not be made after the expiry of 90 days from the 
date on which the party making the application had received the award 
or, if a request has been made under s. 35, from the date on which 
that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal.33 The above 
however does not apply to an application for setting aside on the ground 
that the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption.34 
33 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 37(4).
34 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 37(5). Demanding, offering or accepting bribery or 
any illegal gratification has been described in Public Prosecutor v. Ismail bin 
Mohd Azmi and another appeal [2010] 1 MLJ 108, as ‘a most despicable crime’. 
According to Murray-Aynsley CJ in R v. Teo Cheng Lian [1949] MLJ 170:
‘... bribery and corruption of  officialdom is like a cancer which may grow and 
destroy the whole body ... I do not think that the mere imposition of  a fine is 
likely to act as a deterrent in this class of  offence.’ 
 In Sim Kwang Liang & Anor v. PP [2008] 1 LNS 855, Yew Jen Kie JC said: 
‘... corruption is a sinister thing which has been likened to cancer which, 
if  left undeterred, will destroy the healthy fabric of  the society resulting 
in dissipation of  the nation’s wealth and compromise of  the well-being of  
the people. It is sad to say that the crime of  corruption has not abated and 
judging from the number of  cases registered in courts there is a worrying 
trend of  increase.’ 
 Again, in Haironyzam Mohtar v. Public Prosecutor [2009] 1 LNS 982, Yew Jen 
Kie JC said: 
‘The destructive nature of  corruption is aptly likened to that of  “cancer”.’ 
 The acts of  demanding, offering, receiving or accepting bribery or illegal 
gratification is now governed by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission 
Act 2009 where s. 24(1) of  the said Act provides that the sentence is 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years and a fine of  not less than five 
times the sum or value of  the gratification which is the subject matter of  the 
offence, where such gratification is capable of  being valued or is of  a pecuniary 
nature, or ten thousand ringgit, whichever is the higher.
Setting Aside Award
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Section 50 of the Act provides that any application to the High Court 
under this Act shall be by an originating summons as provided in the 
Rules of Court 2012 (‘ROC 2012’).35 Order 7 r. 2(1A) of the ROC 2012 
provides that every originating summons shall state in its intitulement 
the particular rule of Court and provisions of written law under which 
the Court is being moved. An application made pursuant to this Act must 
be entitled ‘In the matter of ’ the Arbitration Act 2005’; stating as well 
the relevant sections.36 The party taking out an originating summons 
shall be described as a plaintiff, and the other party shall be described 
as the defendant.37 The originating summons must be properly framed 
so as to fulfil its purpose. It must include a statement of the questions 
on which the plaintiff seeks the determination or direction of the High 
Court or, as the case may be, a concise statement of the relief or remedy 
claimed in the proceedings begun by the originating summons with 
sufficient particulars to identify the cause or causes of action in respect 
of which the plaintiff claims that relief or remedy.38 
Enforcement Of Award
 
The parties to an arbitration agreement impliedly, promise to perform 
a valid award. The recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
as contained in arts. 35 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration 1985 is reproduced in ss. 38 
and 39 of the Arbitration Act 2005. Meanwhile, the procedure for 
35 The originating summons procedure does not rely on the use of  pleadings and 
is not complicated by numerous interlocutory proceedings that accompany a 
writ action. It provides a relatively swift and simple means of  obtaining relief  as 
it does not involve substantial or serious dispute of  facts. Evidence is generally 
by affidavit. For general provisions on originating summons, see Rules of  Court 
2012, O. 7.
36 In Cheow Chew Khoon v. Abdul Johari Abdul Rahman [1995] 4 CLJ 127 at 142, 
Gopal Sri Ram JCA stated:
‘... an originating process requiring an intitulement must state, with 
sufficient particularity, either in its heading or in its body, the statute or 
rule of  court under which the court is being moved; otherwise, it would 
be an embarrassing pleading and [is] liable to be struck out, unless sooner 
amended.’
37 Rules of  Court 2012, O. 7 r. 2(2).
38 Rules of  Court 2012, O. 7 r. 3(1).
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the purpose of recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award in 
Malaysia is contained in O. 69 rr. 8 and 9 of the ROC 2012.
Section 38 of the Act states that on an application in writing to the 
High Court, an award made in respect of a domestic arbitration or 
an award from a foreign State shall, subject to this section and s. 39, 
be recognised as binding and be enforced by entry as a judgment in 
terms of the award or by action. The applicant shall produce the duly 
authenticated original award or a duly certified copy of the award 
and the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy of the 
agreement.39 Where the award or arbitration agreement is in a language 
other than the national language or the English language, the applicant 
shall supply a duly certified translation of the award or agreement in the 
English language. 
Section 39(1) of the Act provides inter alia, that recognition or 
enforcement of an award, irrespective of the state in which it was made, 
may be refused only at the request of the party against whom it was 
invoked where that party provides to the High Court proof that the 
award has not become binding on the parties or if the High Court finds 
that the award is in conflict with public policy of Malaysia. In Murray 
& Roberts Australia Pty Ltd v. Earth Support Company (SEA) Sdn 
Bhd,40 it was stated inter alia, that refusal of recognition or enforcement 
of an arbitral award can only be allowed on the grounds stated in 
paras. 39(1)(a) and (b) and the onus of showing why any such 
arbitral award ought not to be recognised or enforced, shifts to the 
party opposing such registration or enforcement.41 In other words, 
the respondent has to rely on any one or more of the grounds in 
paras. 39(1)(a) and (b) of the Act in order to set aside the registration 
of the final award.42 
39 Arbitration Act 2005, s. 38(2). See Tune Talk Sdn Bhd v. Padda Gurtaj Singh 
[2019] 1 LNS 85, CA; CTI Group Inc v. International Bulk Carriers SPA [2017] 
9 CLJ 499, FC.
40 [2015] 6 CLJ 649, HC.
41 Jacob And Toralf  Consulting Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Siemens Industry Software Gmbh 
& Co KG (Germany) & Anor [2018] 1 LNS 814, CA.
42 Wolfgang Leonhard Schulz & Ors v. Sapura-Schulz Hydroforming Sdn Bhd & Anor 
[2019] 4 CLJ 853, HC.  
Enforcement Of  Award
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In Murray & Roberts Australia Pty Ltd’s case, it was stated that the 
Malaysian courts were merely an enforcement court which does not 
exercise any supervisory jurisdiction or power over foreign arbitral 
awards. Only the courts of the country which was designated the seat 
of arbitration, in this case the Australian court, had the supervisory 
jurisdiction and power over the arbitral award and this includes an 
application to set aside the award. Again, in Sintrans Asia Services Pte 
Ltd v. Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd,43 the defendant’s contention was that the 
arbitration clause was not valid, and if so, they would have to establish 
that under the Singapore law because the arbitration agreement clearly 
provided for the law applicable i.e. Singapore laws. In other words, the 
matter would have to be dealt with by the courts having supervisory 
jurisdiction at the seat of arbitration i.e. the Singapore courts. The court 
in Malaysia is purely an enforcement court and must recognise a valid 
arbitration award. 
The manner in which an application is to be made is set out in 
O. 69 r. 8(1) of the ROC 2012 which stipulates that an application for 
permission to enforce an award in the same manner as a judgment or 
an order may be made on an ex parte basis by way of an originating 
summons. Once an ex parte order has been obtained and served, the 
aggrieved party may apply to the court to set aside the award to resist 
enforcement of it within 14 days of service. In such case, the award may 
not be enforced pending disposal of the mater at the inter partes stage 
(O. 69 r. 8(7)). Order 69 r. 9 provides that if an arbitral award from a 
country outside Malaysia has ‘become enforceable in the same manner 
as a judgment given by a court in that place’, a party to the award may 
apply to enforce the award pursuant to r. 8. In other words, a party to 
an arbitral award from a foreign State who intends to enforce the award 
in Malaysia would have to make an application following the procedure 
in O. 69 r. 8. In Murray & Roberts Australia Pty Ltd’s case, it was stated 
inter alia, that there was no requirement for the plaintiff to register and/
or enforce the Australian arbitral awards in Australia before filing the 
originating summons. 
43 [2016] 5 CLJ 746, CA.
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In Christopher Martin Boyd v. Deb Brata Das Gupta,44 it was stated that 
the enforcement of arbitration awards must be viewed in two parts; first 
is the registration of the arbitration award itself as a judgment of the 
court; and secondly, the enforcement or execution of such a judgment. 
The limitation period for enforcement or the execution of the judgment 
of the court is 12 years as clearly prescribed under s. 6(3) of the 
Limitation Act 1953.45 The procedure and the machinery for obtaining 
satisfaction of a judgment or compelling compliance is governed by 
the ROC 2012. The objective of the procedure for enforcement of a 
judgment is to use the assets of the judgment debtor to satisfy the debt 
he or she has failed to pay. 
The methods commonly used in enforcement of a judgment requiring 
the payment of money are as follows: 
(1) Examination of Judgment Debtor. The judgment creditor to 
have the judgment debtor orally examined before the court 
to uncover the debtor’s income and means of satisfying the 
judgment debts; [ROC 2012 O. 48] 
(2) Writs of Seizure and Sale. It involves the seizure of a judgment 
debtor’s property for the purpose of sale in order to satisfy a 
judgment debt; [ROC 2012 O. 47] 
(3) Garnishee Proceedings: It is an order directing the garnishee 
to pay the judgment creditor the amount of any debt due, or 
accruing due, to the judgment debtor from the garnishee, or so 
much thereof as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt; [ROC 
2012 O. 49] 
(4) Charging Order. It enables the court to impose a charge on 
certain securities to which the judgment debtor is beneficially 
entitled to for securing payment of the amount due under the 
judgment. The securities to which a charging order may be 
44 [2014] 9 CLJ 887, FC.
45 Limitation Act 1953, s. 6(3) of  the provides:
‘An action upon any judgment shall not be brought after the expiration of  
twelve years from the date on which the judgment became enforceable and no 
arrears of  interest in respect of  any judgment debt shall be recovered after 
the expiration of  six years from the date on which the interest became due.’
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made are any government stock, and any stock of any company 
registered under any written law, including any such stock 
standing in the name of the Accountant-General and any 
dividend of, or interest payable on, such stock; [ROC 2012 
O. 50]
(5) Obtaining a Stop Notice Over Share. The effect of the stop 
notice is to prevent any payment on the securities mentioned 
in the charging order without notice to the judgment creditor 
affording him an opportunity of asserting his claim; [ROC 2012 
O. 50]
(6) Appointment of Receivers. It is a means of enforcing the rights 
of the judgment creditor against the property of the judgment 
debtor where such property cannot be executed upon by the 
normal legal process; [ROC 2012 O. 51]
 and
(7) Committal for Contempt of Court. [ROC 2012 O. 52] The 
judicial basis for the law of contempt was aptly explained by 
Anuar J in MBF Holdings Bhd & Anor v. Houng Hai Kong 
& Ors:46
It is paramount in the public interest that every court should 
have the power and authority or jurisdiction to punish persons 
who scandalise it or disobey orders made by it. If such power is 
absent, then the public will lose all confidence in the authority 
of the judicial arm of the state leading to anarchy and disorder.
In short, an arbitrator is usually functus officio once a valid award is 
made. An arbitral award is enforced vide the machinery provided by the 
state. The award could be adopted by the High Court and enforced, after 
such adoption, as if it were a judgment of the High Court. Further, the 
arbitral award may be set aside only in the circumstances mentioned in 
sub-ss. 37(1) and (2) which is largely based on the issues relating to the 
award making process and has nothing to do with error of facts and/
or law on the face of record unless the exception applies such as public 
policy. Lastly, the High Court’s power to set aside the award would be 
exercised with utmost care and deliberation.
 46 [1993] 3 CLJ 373 at 378, HC.
